Stockholm Syndrome
The Relationship between the Hostage Taker, the Hostage and the Negotiator
On an August morning in 1973, an escaped convict took four bank employees
hostage in Stockholm, Sweden. For
131 hours, the hostages shared a bank vault
with another convicted criminal, the former cellmate of the hostage taker, who
had demanded his release from a nearby penitentiary. Despite their ordeal,
after the incident, the hostages reported that they had no ill feelings toward
the hostage takers and, further, that they feared the police more than their
captors. Psychologists called this newly discovered phenomenon the Stockholm
Syndrome.
A coping mechanism also known as the Survival Identification Syndrome, the
Common Sense Syndrome, or, simply, transference, the Stockholm Syndrome
usually consists of three components that may occur separately or in
combination with one another: negative feelings on the part of the hostage
toward authorities, positive feelings on the part of the hostage toward the
hostage taker, and positive feelings reciprocated by the hostage taker toward
the hostage. Although a recognized phenomenon, during the last 25 years,
the Stockholm Syndrome has been overemphasized, overanalyzed,
overpsychologized, and over publicized. Those occasions where the Stockholm
Syndrome actually occurs remain exceptions to the rule. In fact, most hostages
do not identify or sympathize with the hostage taker, nor do they see the
police as their adversaries. Rather, they realize that the hostage taker
represents the problem, and the police, the solution. They also understand
that, in general, the police should not acquiesce to the demands of hostage
takers. Thus, with some notable exceptions, during a critical incident,
hostages will behave in a manner that does not put their lives in jeopardy.
According to the FBI's Hostage/Barricade System (HOBAS), a national database
that contains data from over 1,200 reported federal, state, and local
hostage/barricade incidents, 92 percent of the victims of such incidents
reportedly showed no aspect of the Stockholm syndrome. When victims who
only showed negative feelings toward law enforcement (usually due to
frustration with the pace of negotiations) are included, the percentage rises
to 95 percent. In short, this database provides empirical support that the
Stockholm syndrome remains a rare occurrence.
Despite such evidence, some crisis negotiators may have lost sight of the fact
that full-blown Stockholm syndrome occurs only in very few victims. As a
result, they may continue to perpetuate some common misconceptions.
COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS
The Relationship between the Hostage Taker and the Hostage
Some researchers suggest that the transference that occurs as a part of the
Stockholm syndrome commonly develops during intense life-or-death situations.
In doing so, they imply that transference will occur in most crisis
negotiation situations. In fact, Freudian psychoanalysts use the term to
describe a phenomenon that can develop between psychoanalysts and their
patients. During a session, the psychoanalyst remains nondirective and
neutral, encouraging the patient to talk freely and without interruption. As a
result, patients may transfer the attributes of individuals close to them -
for example, their fathers or mothers - to the therapist, or they may transfer
their own feelings about or reactions toward significant others to the
therapist. The therapist recognizes this and uses it to help the patient
change maladaptive behavior. Most important, even in psychoanalysis, the
therapist does not succumb to the psychological phenomenon of transference.
The same holds true in the relationship between the hostage taker and the
hostage; therefore, the Stockholm syndrome rarely occurs.
Interviews with released hostages, specifically in longer-term incidents
(e.g., the TWA 847 hijacking in 1985, where the hostages were held for 2
weeks, and the Cuban uprising at the federal correctional institution in
Talladega, Alabama, where the hostages were held for 12 days) revealed that
the majority of the hostages showed no evidence of the Stockholm syndrome.
Most of the hostages expressed fear that their captors would kill them and
realized that law enforcement officers attempted to do everything possible to
help them.
The Relationship between the Hostage Taker and the Negotiator
The belief that a relationship forms between the hostage taker and the hostage
negotiator also represents a common misconception. After interviewing numerous
flight attendants who had experienced a hijacking, FBI researchers concluded
that three factors must be present for the syndrome to have the potential to
develop. First, a significant length of time must pass. Second, the
hostages and the hostage takers must maintain contact (i.e., the hostages are
not hooded or isolated in a separate room), and third, the hostage takers must
treat the hostages kindly, or at least not physically abuse or verbally
threaten them.
When the syndrome did develop, the hostages frequently said that because they
were trapped together, they shared the same fears and frustrations as the
hostage taker. That is, the hostages feared that the police would accidentally
kill them in an assault, and they wanted to get out of the situation. By
examining factors necessary for the potential formation of the syndrome,
researchers have concluded that the syndrome cannot occur with the negotiator.
The negotiator is not trapped in the same room with the hostage taker and does
not share the same fears and frustrations.
In 1989, the FBI's Special Operations and Research Unit (SOARU), the
predecessor to the crisis negotiation unit, and the University of Vermont
surveyed over 600 police agencies, asking, among other questions, "Due to
emotional involvement with the subject, has your negotiator ever interfered
with or jeopardized an assault?" Not a single agency answered yes. Yet, some
researchers still have concluded that some negotiators may hesitate at the
critical moment and possibly cause the operation to fail. This assumption
represents a variation of the belief that negotiators cannot be told about an
impending assault because of the chance they may divulge critical information
to the captors, thus foiling the attack. The latter belief, which persists
despite no supporting empirical evidence, may prove fatal because tactical
teams planning a rescue or assault may erroneously fail to use the negotiation
team to do everything to make the subject an easy target.
What perpetuates so many misconceptions and erroneous beliefs about the
infamous Stockholm syndrome? First, many find it provocative. In the original
incident, a female hostage allegedly had consensual sex with one of the
hostage takers. Moreover, law enforcement training reviews of actual incidents
understandably tend to focus on those involving extraordinary circumstances.
In addition, the exceptions prove more interesting, prompting additional
discussion. Because the exceptions gamer so much attention, they seem much
more prevalent.
Finally, the Stockholm syndrome remains overemphasized because of its
psychological nature. Historically, law enforcement negotiation has been
psychologically oriented. Because crisis negotiation represents the attempted
verbal manipulation of the behavior of others, it seems natural to use the
Stockholm syndrome to describe certain incidents. However, the fact that
researchers can name or label a phenomenon does not mean they really
understand it. In recognition of this problem, the FBI recently modified the
abnormal psychology portion of its basic crisis negotiation course to downplay
the use of labels. Instead, the FBI's basic course emphasizes active listening
and crisis intervention skills.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcement should continue to study the Stockholm syndrome, while keeping
in perspective the extent and frequency of its occurrence. Although each
person's reaction to being taken hostage remains unique, a set of behaviors
may occur with some victims. The syndrome can consist of one or more of the
following behaviors:
* One or more hostages may exhibit anger and frustration (negative feelings)
toward police, believing either that the police are not doing enough to end
the incident or are preparing an assault that may further endanger the
hostages.
* One or more of the hostages may begin to show sympathy (positive feelings)
toward their captors, believing that they are not such bad people or trying to
convince themselves that the hostage takers will not harm them.
* The hostage takers may reciprocate and show compassion (positive feelings)
toward one or more of the hostages.
Still, the syndrome usually does not develop with hostages. Although the
duration of the incident remains important, the emotional intensity of the
incident and perceived powerlessness of the hostages prove more important than
the simple passage of time. Finally, if the victim receives or witnesses
physical or psychological abuse, the syndrome is extremely unlikely to occur.
Even if some aspect of the syndrome has developed, it can and usually will
cease if the captors either verbally or physically abuse any of the hostages.
In short, the Stockholm syndrome does not appear as pervasive as negotiators
once thought. Although depicted in fiction and film and often referred to by
the news media, the phenomenon actually occurs rarely. Therefore, crisis
negotiators should place the Stockholm syndrome in proper perspective.
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